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OBJECTIVES  OF  MARKETING  RESTRAINTS
The general  objective  is to limit aggregate supply of farm products
to  effective  market demand  at prices  which  will  provide  equitable  re-
turns  to  agricultural  resources.
The more specific  objectives  are:  (1)  to effectively  limit the quan-
tities of various  agricultural commodities  placed  on the market;  (2)  to
raise farm prices and incomes;  (3)  to reduce the Treasury  cost of price
and  income support programs for agriculture;  and  (4)  to avoid undue
restrictions  on  area or farm  specialization,  least-cost  production com-
binations,  and resource  mobility.
OUTLINE  OF  A  PROGRAM  FOR  DIRECT
RESTRAINTS  ON  MARKETINGS
A  program  to effectively  control  marketings  must be  comprehen-
sive enough to prevent  input substitution and product substitution from
circumventing  the  program  objectives.
The  essential  elements  of the program  are:  (1)  definition  of fair
or parity prices for farm products;  (2)  determination  of national mar-
keting  quotas,  (3)  imposition  of  marketing  quotas  on  all farm  com-
modities,  (4)  allocation  of marketing  quotas  to individual  producers,
(5)  absolute  restriction  of marketings  to quotas,  (6)  negotiability  of
marketing  quota  certificates,  and  (7)  correlative  activities  of  supply
stabilization  and  export  sales.
ESTABLISHMENT  OF  FAIR  OR  PARITY  PRICES.  This  would  be  the
responsibility of Congress.  Prices could be so set that they would be fair
to both producers  and consumers.
ESTABLISHMENT  OF  NATIONAL  MARKETING  QUOTAS.  The  U.  S.
Department of Agriculture  would set national sales quotas annually for
each agricultural commodity  in amounts which it estimates  would clear
the market at the  predetermined  fair or parity  prices.  Sales quotas,  by
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duction  period  to  facilitate  production  planning.
IMPOSITION  OF MARKETING  QUOTAS  ON ALL FARM COMMODITIES.
In practice,  quotas may not be needed for each individual  commodity.
Some commodities  may be  grouped into  a common class-feed  grains,
for example-with  a single national  quota for the entire group of com-
modities.  A farmer  might  then  sell  any one  or combinations  of these
commodities  in quantities  equivalent to his quota of a base commodity
within  that group.
ALLOCATION  OF  MARKETING  QUOTAS  TO  INDIVIDUAL  FIRMS.  Each
farmer would  receive  his  pro rata share of the national  sales quota for
each  commodity,  based  on  his  historical  record  of production.  Each
farmer's  share  might  be  received  in  marketing  certificates  of  small
denominational  units  sufficiently  early  to  enable  him  to  develop  his
production  plans  in  accordance  with his  quota.
ABSOLUTE  RESTRICTION  OF  SALES  TO  QUOTAS.  Once  such  a pro-
gram  were  in  operation,  a farmer  could  not legally  market any com-
modity  having  a  national  quota  unless  he  had  marketing  certificates
to  cover the  quantities  involved.  Each year each  farmer could  market
an  announced  percentage  of the  face value  of each  of his  certificates.
NEGOTIABILITY  OF  QUOTA  CERTIFICATES.  Farmers  could  buy  or
sell marketing  certificates.  The individual  farm operator would be free
to  expand  or contract  production.  The  value  of operating  in an agri-
culture where  product  supplies are limited and prices relatively certain
would,  of course,  get  capitalized  into  these  marketing  certificates.
CORRELATIVE  ACTIVITIES.  Since  commercial  agriculture  does not
operate  in an  economic  or social vacuum,  at least two other programs
should  be linked  with the  above  supply control  program.  They would
deal with:  (1)  production for export and  (2)  supply stabilization.  Our
purpose  here  is merely to recognize  them  as necessary adjuncts  to sup-
ply  control.
To illustrate,  some commodities  have a large stake  in international
markets  where  the  market  price  may  differ  greatly  from  the  defined
fair price.  To  assure  fair prices to producers  of such commodities  and
to permit  them to compete  in world markets, export  subsidies or com-
pensatory  payments  on  domestic  portions  of  quotas,  etc.,  might  be
used.  At  the  same  time, steps  would  need to be  taken  to prevent for-
eign producers of farm products from taking advantage of higher prices
in our domestic market.
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if the U.  S. Department  of Agriculture would operate  a purchase, stor-
age,  and disposal  program  in connection  with the general control pro-
gram.  In years  of below-average  yields  government-held  stocks would
be put on the  market  to hold prices  at the defined  parity level,  and in
years  of  above-average  yields  marketing  quotas  would  be increased  a
few  percentage  points  and  the  excess  supply  purchased  and  stored.
This  type  of  bona  fide  storage  program  would  stabilize  marketable
supplies  and  ease  the  production  problems  of  farmers  arising  from
weather  uncertainty.
ILLUSTRATIVE  SIMILAR  PROGRAMS
Several  piece-meal  attempts have been made to control supplies of
agricultural  commodities.  Such  programs  have undoubtedly  held sup-
plies  of controlled  commodities below  the levels  that would  have been
obtained  in the  absence  of restrictive  programs.
SUGAR  CONTROL PROGRAM.  The basic elements of the sugar control
program  include:  (1)  determination  each year of the quantity of sugar
needed to supply the nation's  requirements  at prices reasonable  to con-
sumers  and  fair  to  producers;  (2)  division  of the  U.  S. sugar market
among the domestic  and foreign supplying  areas  by the  use of quotas;
(3)  allotment  of  these  quotas  among  the  various  processors  in  each
area;  (4)  adjustment  of  production  in  each  area  to  the  established
quotas;  (5)  payments  to  producers  out of Treasury funds  to  compen-
sate for production adjustments  and to augment  their income;  and  (6)
equitable  division  of  sugar  returns  among  beet and  cane  processors,
growers,  and  farm  workers.
TOBACCO  CONTROL  PROGRAM.  Approximately  one-third  of annual
tobacco  output  enters  the  international  market.  Three  characteristics
of  this  commodity,  however,  are  worth  noting  and  possibly prophetic
of  results  from  aggregate  agricultural  supply  control:  (1)  tobacco
does not have  a close  substitute;  (2)  the acreage  planted to tobacco  is
a  negligible proportion  (less  than  .5  percent)  of total crop acreage  of
the  U.  S.,  and  (3)  it  is  easily storable.
Tobacco  prices  are  supported  at  90 percent  of parity.  Production
is limited through acreage allotments,  and severe penalties  (75 percent
of the preceding  season's average market price)  are imposed on output
from  non-allotment  acres.
The  costs  of tobacco programs  have  not been  high. In fact,  Com-
modity  Credit  Corporation  operations  for  the  period  1933  through
June 20,  1956,  showed a realized  net cost of only $300,000. Benedict
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the  tobacco  program,  if  its  general  objectives  are  accepted,  has been
one  of the most manageable  and successful  of the farm programs."
Despite  "rigid  support"  of prices  at 90 percent  of parity,  tobacco
consumption  has  increased  sharply.  Per  capita  consumption  of  all
tobacco  products  is  now  approximately  50  percent  greater  than  in
1929.  In fact,  per capita usage  in the form  of cigarettes  almost tripled
during this period.
EFFECTS  ON  PRODUCTION
AND  THE  DISTRIBUTION  OF  PRODUCTION
The price  level defined as "fair" would be the primary  indicator of
ultimate  effects of an aggregate supply control program. Market quotas
consistent with higher prices would require short-run reductions in out-
put  for many commodities.  Much dissatisfaction  would probably  arise
from  non-proportionate  changes  in  output  and  prices.
SHORT-RUN  EFFECTS.  As compared  with present programs  or the
free  market, some  agricultural  resources  would  be unemployed  or un-
deremployed.  The most immobile or fixed resource would be used more
extensively.  Demand  would  fall  for  those  resources  that  can  be  re-
duced,  e.g., hired labor  and certain forms of capital.  Greater emphasis
would  be  placed  on  upgrading  products  at the  farm.  Some  of the  re-
sources  previously  committed  to  volume  could  be  redirected  toward
quality  of product.
Some farms and areas producing "excess commodities"  would face
greater  output reduction than others.  On the other hand, the output of
commodities  with  more  inelastic  demand  would  need  to  be  reduced
relatively little to result in substantial  price increases.
LONGER-RUN  EFFECTS.  Areas with comparative  advantages in the
production  of  particular  commodities  will  tend  to  buy  quotas  from
areas  less  favored competitively.  Farmers with  superior ability  or eco-
nomies  of  scale  could  expand  their  production  by  buying  marketing
certificates.  Fewer,  but larger,  farms would  produce the restricted out-
put unless minimum  quotas were invoked.  Production  efficiency  could
be increased more than under present programs.  But farm enlargement,
efficiency,  and  farm  and  area  specialization  may  not  take  place  as
rapidly as under free market conditions.  Why? New farmers would have
to buy "certificates"  as well as the farm's  physical resources.
EFFECTS  ON  DEMAND  AND  THE  DISTRIBUTION  OF  DEMAND
Program  effects  on  demand  are  likely  to  be  insignificant  if  total
demand  is  viewed  as  a  schedule  of  quantities  demanded  over  the
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(for products  sans  services)  under  varying  time perspectives  prevents
accurate  evaluation  of  such a  program.
In  the  short  run,  a  smaller  quantity  of  farm  products  would  be
available, and consumers'  money expenditures for farm products would
be higher.  However,  the  price effect  of reduced  output  would be  rela-
tively smaller  at retail  than at the farm.
Should farm product price relationships  be altered,  the demand for
commodities  having  the least relative  price rise might increase  because
of product  substitution possibilities  in consumption.
Limited output and  higher prices  would make an export  sales pro-
gram  mandatory  in  order  to  maintain  a quantity  position  in  foreign
markets  equivalent  to that  of the  free market.
In addition, maintenance  of prices  above free market  levels would
encourage  the  development of new products and  substitutes.
In the  long run, total demand  might be reduced  to the extent that:
(1)  substitution  (new  products)  in  consumption  would  be  possible;
(2)  other  producers  (foreign)  could  supply  a  greater  portion of  the
market;  and  (3)  greater "nutrition-cost  ratio"  consumption  habits are
formed.
EFFECTS  ON  INCOME  AND  THE  DISTRIBUTION  OF  INCOME
SHORT-RUN  EFFECTS.  The  smaller  quantity  of agricultural  prod-
ucts,  without a compensatory  change  in nonagricultural  output would
lower  the  level  of real national  income.
Aggregate  agricultural  income  and factor  returns  would be  larger
than  under free  market  conditions.  However,  this  would  be merely  a
redistribution  of  the  income  that  had  accrued  to  non-farmers  due to
excess  supply  of  farm products.
The larger income in agriculture would be distributed  among farm-
ers  roughly in proportion to  volume of sales. Consequently,  those now
having  the  lowest  incomes  would  generally  receive  the  least  boost  in
income.
Lower income consumers  would have  a porportionately greater re-
duction  in their real  income because  of higher prices  of food products.
LONGER-RUN  EFFECTS.  These  are less  obvious. The income bene-
fits  to  agriculture  would  accrue  to  the present  generation  of  farmers.
These benefits would  ultimately  be  capitalized into the  vehicle of con-
trol.  Initial  holders  of certificates  who  sell  them and  quit farming will
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the program benefits become an imputed production cost.
A  continued  program  limiting output would  hold  aggregate  farm
income  above  free  market  levels.  The  program  probably  would  not
seriously retard labor transfer  out of agriculture in  a strong and grow-
ing general  economy.  Nevertheless,  resource  returns  between  agricul-
ture  and  nonagriculture  would  not necessarily  be  equalized  because
of continued  advances in nonagricultural  incomes.
GENERAL  IMPLICATIONS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  THIS  APPROACH
"Boom  and  bust"  characteristics  of  agricultural  income  could  be
alleviated  by  marketing  controls.  Correlative  storage  and  export pro-
grams  are  necessary  adjuncts  to  supply  control.
Treasury  cost of production  adjustments  would  be lower than un-
der  present  programs.  However,  cost  of  the  stabilization  and  export
adjuncts  would  partially  offset this  reduction.  Program costs would be
borne  by  consumers  through  expenditures  for  farm  products,  rather
than  through taxation  on the basis of ability to  pay.
Quotas would have to be negotiable  to restrict "black marketings."
Program  policing  would  still  be a problem.
Annual  fluctuations  in production  on individual "farms"  and in the
aggregate would be difficult  to handle.  Purchase and sale of certificates
among farmers would give some annual flexibility, but annual output of
non-storables  above national  quotas and above expectations  could pre-
sent serious  problems.  Producers  of all agricultural commodities  prob-
ably could not  be  treated equitably.  Physical deterioration  or destruc-
tion of food products is not socially acceptable.
A smaller volume of farm products would be available for handling.
Processing,  marketing,  and  distribution  facilities  would  consequently
be  underemployed.
SUMMARY
The  income  of  commercial  farmers  can  be  raised  and,  to  some
degree,  stabilized by a program of direct limitations on marketings. To
achieve  this  objective,  quotas  must be  invoked  universally  on produc-
tion. Benefits from the program will be capitalized into the controlling
device-marketing  certificates  in  this  case.  The  present  generation  of
farmers would  be the beneficiaries.
Income  would  be  transferred  to  agriculture  from  consumers.  In
the short run the level of real national income would be reduced. Should
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tional  income would  remain below  its potential. Income  would not  be
distributed more equally  among producers  of farm products or  among
consumers.
Negotiability  of marketing  certificates  would  permit entry and de-
parture  of producers  of farm commodities.  Should conditions  warrant
shifts  in producing  areas, farms would become larger and area special-
ization could take place more rapidly than under present programs.
Quota determinations  and allocations  for the many  farm products
present  special  practical  problems.  Some producer  groups  would  not
welcome  output  controls.
Farm  output  and  its  composition  could  be  made  more consistent
with  demand  and  its  characteristics.  In  addition,  individual  farmers
would  be  free to  use  the least-cost  resource  mix for the production  of
their  market  quota.
A  supply  control  program  probably  could  not  stand  alone;  but,
with the  necessary adjuncts,  it could be made to work if society is will-
ing to bear the cost and if farmers are willing to accept absolute produc-
tion  controls.
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